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H.D.'s Flaws Paul Smith 
IT'S PROBABLY INEVITABLE that H.D. should have become 
something of a paradigmatic figure as a woman writer and in discussions 
of women writers' relation to the anglophone modernist tradition. This 
is, on one level, because she is one of very few women writers in the early 
twentieth century whose work has been automatically (almost) sucked in 
to the masculinist canon ?there to be celebrated or criticized, loved or 
despised, but represented just the same. And it may also be partly because 
very few women writers of the time had such strong connections (troubl 
ed ones in H.D.'s case, of course) with the supposed grand masters of 
modernism ?Pound, Williams, and Lawrence in particular?and with the 
somewhat precious and preposterous "artistic scene" and social life that at 
tended modernism's embarcation and passage. 
To be sure, these modernist credentials and the condition of being, as I 
put it, "sucked into the canon" are not necessarily the most important or 
even the most rewarding questions to be bringing up in relation to H.D. 
After all, this is a writer around whose work so many other propositions 
and arguments can be made. If what I have to say here ends up not repeat 
ing those other kinds of claim, it's not that I'm unaware of them or dis 
agree with them. I'm more interested, instead, in looking at how some 
claims about H.D.'s life and work bear upon a particular set of relation 
ships and their concomitant political effects: relationships, for example, 
between H.D. and her work and the idea of a canon, on one hand, and to 
the manners of both traditional masculinist and feminist criticism on the 
other; and thus, also, the relationship of feminism to the apparatus of male 
domination (like the canon, insofar as that is part of the mechanisms his 
torically installed by men on a terrain which feminists effectively contest, 
namely literary studies). 
My questions are to be construed around H.D. and her work because 
for me that work has been salutary. As a student of modernism I've often 
felt her work as a kind of surprise or as a special treat within a species of 
writing which I found both problematic and dull ?and very often offen 
sive.1 Without ever really meaning to, but submitting to a kind of neces 
sity, I've tended to think of H.D.'s writing as in some way (or in a 
number of ways) paradigmatic. A perhaps churlish disdain for high 
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modernism and for what I think to find in it has led me to privilege H.D.'s 
work for its ostensible difference. A woman writing with a highly 
elaborated concern to ask about the relations between language and the 
convolutions of sexed identity. A woman whose most difficultly achieved 
work constitutes an instance where masculinist models of writing can be 
seen 
undergoing revision. A woman whose complex oeuvre is filled with 
accounts of the interface between preestablished masculine power and 
emergent feminist power. 
Not that I think these qualities, these differences, to be the whole 
story?although, I sometimes feel with some dismay, they can come to 
constitute the whole story for some feminist critics who also take H.D.'s 
work as paradigmatic. Perhaps as a result of being unable to undo totally 
the privilege and the habits of being a male (critic), I've always wanted to 
see another story too: the story of what might be described as H.D.'s com 
plicity. That is, the cause of her work (its origin and its tendentiousness) 
seems to me to reside often quite determinedly within the systems of 
power and with the empowered men which characterize modernism. 
Many of the demerits that I take the male modernists to exhibit are not un 
equivocally revised in H.D.'s work: they are also to a certain degree sus 
tained, or replicated. Thus there is, it seems to me, a kind of double func 
tion to H.D.'s writing: it is, by her own account, "bound up"2 with (and 
by) exemplars of masculine power, and tries not only to transcend them 
but to equal them. 
Hers is a project which thus leads quite clearly to a political issue and be 
speaks a dilemma which, for all that it is currently most visible in and 
through the efforts of the women's movement, is common to any contes 
tatory or oppositional practice. The problem can be stated in many differ 
ent ways but it might be put as follows: first, to what extent are the 
powers of dominant groups and of all the institutional paraphernalia 
around those powers enviable and accessible; and second, to what extent are 
they just despicable and dispensable? It is not wise, perhaps, for any opposi 
tional impulse to rush to conclusions to such questions. Rather, an 
equivocation around those problems is a necessary component of contesta 
tion itself. To say this is to allow, at least, for the inevitable difficulty of 
real historical conditions. Since social and political relations are not simple, 
the temptation either simply to adopt the strategies and modes of already 
instituted and proven power or simply to dismiss those strategies and 
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modes is a Utopian lure. This is not to say that there can be no use in the 
Utopian urge toward either direction; it's just that neither way can be the 
way. 
Feminism has, of course, made such questions, such accommodations, 
the nub of much of its debate?these problems have been a crucial part of 
the women's movement for about the last twenty years. Equally, they 
have been part of many other struggles, in this country and elsewhere, for 
ages. Of course, to point this out is not to deny the specificity of women's 
struggles, but it is to recognize that the strategies of resistance and em 
powerment are not unique to feminism. Wherever resistance is practiced, 
questions of tactical empowerment inevitably come up. 
Saying this in the context of H.D. and her texts may seem a little odd to 
some. What I have called the double function in/of H.D.'s texts does not 
always seem to allow them to be described as oppositional. A considera 
tion of, for instance, the relationships with men with which her writing 
often seems obsessed does not obviously lead toward any sense of feminist 
empowerment. In fact, one kind of reading of H.D.'s work would con 
clude that it's ultimately debilitated by those relationships, or by the spec 
tre of masculine power (Pound's, Lawrence's, Lord Dowding's, Freud's, 
etc.) that it continually inscribes in itself. Such a reading (which would 
establish H.D. as, in the words of a male colleague, "the poetess of penis 
envy") is not so much wholly inappropriate as it is distressingly familiar 
and effective. To be sure, it is a reading born of a lack of political sym 
pathy, of a certain unwillingness in relation to feminism 
? 
and, finally, one 
which refuses much of the strength of H.D.'s texts. But equally, it must 
be admitted, it is the epitome of the kinds of reading which have assured 
H.D.'s place in the patriarchal family of the canon ?and which have con 
signed her to the dubious status of sister, or even of maid in that 
household, awarded points for trying hard but never credited with an in 
dependent existence. 
It's interesting, by the way, to compare H.D.'s fate in that regard with 
the fortunes of two other women writers of the era who both have some 
thing like the same "connections": Virginia Woolf and Gertrude Stein. 
Neither of these is really in the same position as H.D. in relation to the 
masculinist canon, but each does have her own existence there: Woolf 's 
position is by now virtually unimpeachable; Stein's is secured by dint of 
the fact that her writing is in the end masculinist and, playing by the right 
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avant-garde rules, safe enough despite its difficulty. But H.D. is not fully 
acceptable in the way that both of these women are. This difference may 
have something to do with the biographically attested sexuality of each of 
them ?H.D.'s being in a sense more of a mystery than that of the other 
two and thus more susceptible of complex and contradictory accommoda 
tions on the part of masculinist arbiters of taste (literary and sexual!). 
Those maneuvers result in an evaluation of H.D.'s work as in some way 
insufficient but tolerated. 
This is a view which I think can be discerned in almost any male writer's 
dealings with H.D. Most recently I found it replicated in an English 
writer's review of Barbara Guest's biography, Herself Defined.3 Peter Ack 
royd ends his review with 
. . . and in this biography Ms Guest has captured the 'feel' of a life 
which was fragmented, sometimes desperate and eventually unful 
filled. 
It's true, of course, that Ackroyd's adjectives here describe H.D's "life" 
rather than, strictly speaking, her texts. But they are the predictable ac 
companiment for the terms which often describe H.D.'s actual texts. A 
few of Ackroyd's remarks: "short and rather toneless lines"; "her fiction is 
actually more interesting than her later poetry, although even this is some 
thing of an acquired taste [!]"; "flat and disjunctive prose"; "a somewhat 
whimsical manner which relies on a private network of associations and 
perceptions. She does not seem to think of or care about any audience"; 
and so on. And all these failings or difficulties for the male reader are, ap 
parently, "in part the result of [a] self-obsession" (women's threatening 
and fatal narcissistic flaw, re-presented here, as always, in explanation of 
their 
weakness); and they are "also related to the facts of a life in which she 
was cocooned, subsidised and protected" (a description of a kind of life 
which women are constantly expected to accept, but which can be turned 
against them to confirm their weakness). 
What's emblematic about these comments (no more troublesome, 
probably, in Ackroyd's case than in many others) is that the link proposed 
between H.D.'s life-as-a-woman and her writing-as-a-woman has very 
particular political consequences and arises from the kind of critical pre 
suppositions which are always compatible with masculinist domination. I 
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want for the most part to put to one side this hoary old question 
? that of 
the validity of making a firm link between the "life" and the "work"?and 
simply point out that, so far as most male critics of H.D.'s work are con 
cerned, that is a legitimate(d) and largely automatic link. In a very real his 
torical sense it is one which has always allowed male critics to place 
women writers where they want them. In part, it's the flaws of the life 
which give rise to the flaws of the writing. 
A male critic who would be sympathetic to feminism might not neces 
sarily have to abandon such methodological connections, but would, I 
think, have to recognize something about them if he were to accommo 
date a woman's work in a sympathetic manner. In H.D.'s case, that is, he 
would have to recognize that both the supposed "flaws" of the life and the 
"flaws" of the writing are simultaneously produced by and productive of 
specific historical moments and modes of women's oppression. It seems 
useless, that is, to try to criticize the work-as-a-result-of-the-life without 
at least identifying the sexual-political conditions from which it arose, 
without examining the tensions it maintains (its resistance and its complic 
ity) with those conditions, and without thus recognizing the struggle of 
empowerment going on both within and without the texts. 
Equally, it would not be too much to ask that the view of the work of 
art which lurks behind sentiments like Ackroyd's be dispensed with. It is 
possible nowadays to consider that it is precisely in a text's simultaneous 
"strengths" and "flaws" (in its contradictions, its fragmentation and lack 
of fulfillment, even in its desperation) that its import can be found. The 
old sense of the organic unity of the text and the demands for plenitude, 
symmetry, and ideological ambition are all caught up in notions of art 
which have continually claimed for it a transcendent relation to the every 
day struggles of human existence. And those notions have, equally, been 
prominent among the multifarious bulwarks of masculinist privilege in re 
lation to artistic production. Reading the text's flaws back into the life 
(and presumably it's possible to do such a reading the other way around as 
well) without examining the function of the life or its definition in rela 
tion to the forces which surround it ignores the text's dialectical character. 
Such readings foreclose, then, not only on the social provenance of the 
text but also on the oscillatory and "borderline" nature of textuality itself. 
And to say all this is to ignore what some might see as an even greater 
critical arrogance ?the assumption that a judgment can be so summarily 
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made about the completeness of someone's life. It's tempting to ask how 
Ackroyd's comments jibe with the quotation from H.D. which ends 
Guest's book: "I think I did get what I was looking for from life and art." 
But beyond that, the bigger irony here is that Guest's biography consis 
tently discourages all too easy (that is, masculinist) judgments about H.D. 
and her work. It is a book which, unlike some other attempts to recount 
H.D.'s 
"experience," is remarkable for its ability to sketch the details of 
her life without judgment, without making them fit precisely into a 
presignified moral schema, and without relating them to unreflexive and 
institutionalized notions about literature. Equally, it's a book which is 
clear about the double set of implications in H.D.'s life and work. That is to 
say, it clarifies H.D.'s implication in the world of the high modernists and 
their acolytes and also suggests what that implies about the work itself. 
It's never a question here of a straight reading of the life and the work to 
gether, but always a question of how the two are implicated. At any rate, 
Barbara Guest seems to be able to avoid suggesting that either the life or 
the work could or should have been other than they were/are; neither can 
be seen as ideological projects, to be summed up or turned to a neat 
closure; neither is internally consistent or even expected to be; and H.D. 
herself cannot be handed the entire blame (or even the praise) for the way 
those two things work out. 
The jacket blurb to Herself Defined makes much of the fact that Guest is 
herself a poet and thus more nearly "attuned" or "sympathetic" to H.D. 
than one might normally expect a biographer to be. A certain suspicion is 
not unwarranted when such claims are made by publishers' mouthpieces, 
but in this case it may be that Guest's position as herself a woman writer 
has provided the "sympathy" through which to avoid the doctrinaire cer 
tainties about art which underpin masculine criticism and to drop the 
question about the ultimate value of H.D.'s work. This means, in effect, 
that the historical impulse of Guest's book takes some precedence over the 
purely literary. But when it's understood that the notion of the "purely 
literary" hides within itself both a set of assumptions and judgments about 
the nature of the work of art and also constitutes the rudiments of a ma 
chinery which has historically fed male domination of the literary terrain, 
Guest's tendency can come to be recognized as crucial. 
The establishment of transcendent systems of value and the concomi 
tant 
ranking of works within canonical formation constitute a central 
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mechanism in the production and reproduction of power. The mainten 
ance of such a mechanism is perhaps even the sole raison d'?tre for literary 
studies in this day and age. Our contemporary guardians of "the tradi 
tion," some of the more vicious of them now ensconced in the appropriate 
sections of the Reagan administration, are probably more attuned to the 
ideological effects of literature and its institutions than are many actual lit 
erary critics and writers. In such a context the project of counterposing a 
women writers' tradition or canon to the one traditionally (and now) 
proffered is, obviously, crucial. It aims at opposing entrenched privilege 
and encourages empowerment for women writers and readers. It can also 
have the happy effect on male readers and writers of demystifying systems 
of power they have been used to inhabiting. 
But for this male critic it can still seem strange to see just the content, as 
it were, of the apparatus changed without immediate reference to a goal of 
changing the apparatus itself and the structures of power which govern it. 
Filling in the gaps in our account of the tradition and making women 
writers present in history nourishes a certain kind of equality, perhaps, but 
does not always or necessarily address a critique to the prevailing power 
structures. Assuming that such a critique is regarded as necessary by fem 
inism (an assumption which I hope I can make, on the grounds that what's 
fundamentally wrong with patriarchy is the way it systematically produces 
and reproduces its own power and thence very specific instances and kinds 
of oppression), it might well include a project to review both the advan 
tages and disadvantages of having established this kind of equality as a goal 
in and of itself. If an understanding, some kind of blueprint, of patriarchal 
structures is required, then work like H.D.'s (and thus like Guest's) be 
comes doubly instructive according to what I've called its double function. 
It can not only be encouraging, but also act as the story of a struggle from 
which the terms of struggle can be abstracted. It's then through those ab 
stractions that the fundaments of patriarchal power can be attacked. 
What I'm talking about here is already enacted in some feminist work, 
of course. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's Madwoman in the Attic strikes 
me as an 
attempt to deal simultaneously with the question of establishing a 
women writers' tradition or canon (work which the two of them have ex 
tended in "their" recent Norton 
anthology) and the problem of women 
writers' often unresolved struggle, such as H.D.'s, with the structures of 
their oppression. Gubar and Gilbert explore, for instance, the lack of con 
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fidence or the ambivalence about their work which the women in the 
emergent canon experience; this ambivalence is usually posed as some 
thing resulting from the difficult historical conditions under which their 
texts are produced. But in Gubar and Gilbert's account these texts are 
habitually called upon to rise above those conditions, or to be their resolu 
tion and thus to be a kind of sufficient triumph in themselves. Without ig 
noring the real asperity of the conditions from which women's writing has 
emerged, and without misrecognizing the difficulty of the struggle to 
speak and to be heard, I'd suggest that texts?whether they're by women 
or not? can never 
simply be taken as a kind of triumph over real conditions. 
They might be said to register in some way the struggle itself. But that 
struggle becomes secondary if the texts themselves are read as signs of hav 
ing transcended the difficulties and contradictions produced in everyday 
life by systemic masculinism. 
I don't mean here to be offering a correction of Gubar and Gilbert's 
project, nor to be warning committed feminists of their "errors." Part of 
what I'm saying, however, assumes the possibility that feminism as a thor 
oughgoing critique of masculinism will be for men, as well as for women, 
and in saying this I might well come athwart of some of feminism's aspects 
and projects. If this is to be the case, it seems nonetheless essential that 
men take the risk of it and involve themselves, perhaps not so nearly in the 
refunctioning of existing apparatus and structures, but more exactly in the 
critique of the assumption and reproduction of masculinist structures of 
power by other men. Thus in relation to a writer like H.D., where 
feminists such as Gubar and Gilbert might want to see the double function 
of the texts as ultimately the expression of an aspect of a woman writer's 
consciousness, male critics might do well to investigate the aspects of her 
texts where there is as it were a conjunction with recognizable masculinist 
suppositions and ideologies. For example, it could be suggested that 
what's often essentially important to H.D.'s texts is the nature of 
masculine power as it is pointed up by precisely H.D.'s lack of con 
sciousness. Those moments when H.D. manages to find (as the vernacular 
goes) her original and authentic voice are intertwined, not just with the 
kind of ambivalence about her work's value which Madwoman explores, 
but equally with what can appear to be almost a willful ignorance of the 
complicity of her texts with masculinist authority (in whatever guises that 
presents itself). 
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Again, it's here that the double-edged quality of writing which is taken 
as 
oppositional might assert itself. Our reading of an oppositional text, of 
feminist or some other impulse, can, I think, take as a strength the oscilla 
tions and the contradictions in the text itself. It is these latter components 
which seem to me to actually constitute an oppositional text and to be the 
mark of such a text's provenance and participation in an historically struc 
tured set of ideological formations. Without that mark the text is limited 
in potential political effect (except perhaps for a rhetorical and exhortative 
effect which would not be negligible, but only part of the story). 
Of course, what I'm saying immediately brings up questions which 
have haunted Marxist critics, among others, for some time now: the rela 
tionship between texts and ideologies, between texts and histories, the 
role of art as a tendentious intervention in those relationships, and so on. 
From the long history of the attempts to clarify such questions, I'd be in 
clined here to draw on the claim made by writers like Althusser and 
Macherey: that texts operate as it were on the cusp between their own 
ideological provenance or complicity and their function as devices which 
leave those ideologies and histories open to investigation. Not that the real 
substance of texts' historical and ideological appurtenance ?or, far less, of 
the writer's 
"experience" 
? are ever 
unproblematically made present (or 
"given to be 'seen,' 
" 
as Althusser puts it), but rather that historically exist 
ing ideological relationships can be abstracted from the literary text and 
operated upon by the critic. Wherever critics are willing to have those re 
lationships resolved and "utopianized" the potential power of texts to be 
come transformational (rather than simply oppositional) is weakened or 
sometimes negated altogether. 
It's because H.D.'s work has become a site where these kinds of ques 
tions can emerge that it is of importance. Hers is paradigmatically the kind 
of text which leaves room for no simple answers to the question of its 
"tendency." But it is precisely in its aspects which are often regarded as its 
lacks, its flaws and its weaknesses?those judgments which feminist vin 
dication and canonization of a writer like H.D. will sometimes try to 
counter or overturn ?that H.D.'s text can, I think, be claimed to be most 
strong and vital. H.D.'s work ?like all our work and thought, prob 
ably?is marked by the very problems it tries to solve. It oscillates, and 
this oscillation can perhaps come to be considered its very contribution. 
85 
This work shows its whole significance, I'd suggest, when it is allowed its 
residence in the grey areas of its ?and H.D.'s ?supposed flaws. 
Notes 
1. For some attempt to explain and justify (in relation to Ezra Pound, at least) these 
rather contentious comments, see my Pound Revised (London 1983), which also includes a 
chapter about H.D. 
2. H.D. makes this remark in End to Torment, which is perhaps the text where she most 
squarely confronts the experiential basis of what I call the double function inscribed in her 
work. 
3. Peter Ackroyd reviews Barbara Guest's Herself Defined {New York, 1984)?in the Lon 
don Sunday Times, 26 May 1985. 
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